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Public Participation in Risk Regulation
Thomas 0. McGarity*
I. Introduction
During the years that have intervened since the
consumer/environmental decade of 1967-1977, the basic principle that
the "public" ought to play a role in regulatory decisions involving health
and environmental risks has not been seriously questioned. That a social
consensus has solidified around this principle is in many ways
remarkable, given the prevailing model of administrative decision
making that dominated thinking about that subject from the New Deal to
the mid-1960's. 1 The New Deal institution-builders placed great stock
in expertise as the answer to social problems, and the great repositories
of expertise were the brand new agencies that were created during the
heyday of the New Deal.
Under the New Deal model of administrative decision making,
agency experts would write standards, issue permits and generally
implement broad statutory grants of power to regulate "in the public
interest". The agency was the public's representative, and it could be
trusted to reign in corporations' uninhibited pursuit of their own private
interests. Perhaps the best symbol of this view of regulation still stands
outside the offices of the Federal Trade Commission in Washington,
D.C. in the form of a statute in which a determined and very muscular
man struggles to control a beautiful, but high-strung stallion.
* Professor McGarity teaches at the University of Texas School of Law. His
B.A. (physics) is from Rice, and his J.D. is from the University of Texas.
1 Also consider that the Administrative Procedure Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
551 et seq., has been essentially unchanged since its passage in 1946.
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Over the years, however, the New Deal model encountered
significant impediments. First, after the "happy hot dogs" who founded
the agencies moved on to more lucrative or more powerful positions,
top-flight experts were generally unwilling to work in regulatory
agencies. The United States bureaucracy never acquired the status of the
civil service in some European countries. Regulatory agencies simply
could not compete in monetary rewards or prestige with universities and
private industry. More importantly, it soon became apparent, as the
New Deal model was expanded beyond the traditional areas of regulated
utilities and antitrust policing, that the experts did not have all of the
answers. Many regulatory problems were too complex even for the
experts, and most had political components that simply defied rational
analysis. Finally, critical evaluations of the agencies in the mid-sixties
by Congressional committees and self-proclaimed public interest groups
like "Nader's Raiders" revealed that far from hewing to the original
model, the regulatory agencies had evolved during a couple of decades
of benign neglect into "captive" entities that were for the most part
playing the tunes called by the regulated industries. It was as if the horse
and the man struck a bargain by which the horse would allow the man to
ride on its back so long as they both went where the horse wanted to go.
Under the considerable pressures of the late sixties and early
seventies, the New Deal model rapidly gave way to the "interest
representation" model, in which regulatory decisions are arrived at
through the interplay of contending interest groups. The regulatory
process in this model thus becomes a surrogate for the political process
itself. Congress, which for a number of reasons cannot bring itself to
resolve definitively difficult political clashes, delegates controversial
issues to the regulatory agencies for resolution by the erstwhile
"experts", knowing full well that expertise is incapable of providing
final answers. The agencies which inherit the political debate then
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attempt to resolve individual cases by finding a middle ground among
the contending forces. Public participation, therefore, becomes an
essential ingredient of the policy making process.2
At about the same time that the courts were discovering and
implementing the interest representation model, Congress was becoming
very active in enacting substantive reform legislation aimed at health and
environmental problems. Once again, on the surface of things, it
appeared that the best way to establish and implement health and
environmental standards was to delegate the standard-setting function to
experts. Only experts could understand the complex scientific and
economic considerations that were necessarily a part of the decision
making process. But any attempts to invoke the New Deal model for
solving the newly found health and environmental problems quickly ran
up against the experience that the reformers had encountered with the
old-line New Deal agencies. Once burned, they were unwilling to place
their trust in experts to decide sensitive questions involving public health
and the environment.
The debate over the proper role for expertise in risk regulation has
never been fully resolved. Both environmentalists and industry
frequently invoke the wisdom of experts when they perceive that the
judgment of the experts will help advance their views of the issue. And
both denigrate expertise when it does not point toward substantive ends
that they prefer. Yet many, if not most, important health and
environmental questions are in fact not resolvable by the experts. The
available information and the state of the scientific art is often so poor
that the experts can at best hazard highly uncertain educated guesses.
The tough issues are by default resolved on the basis of outcome-
2 See generally, STEWART, THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 33 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975); T.J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 125,
126, 148-49, 155 (1969) - (describing in disparaging terms "Interest Group
Liberalism").
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oriented policy considerations. 3 Sometimes this explicit invocation of
policy considerations to resolve highly technical regulatory issues is
done explicitly for all the world to see. All too often, however, it is done
behind closed doors.
The demands for public participation in risk regulation, therefore,
stems from a distrust of experts, a corresponding distrust of regulatory
decision makers, and a conviction that most important risk regulations
issues are not resolvable solely by reference to expertise. Yet as the
"interest representation" model has continued to evolve in the context of
risk regulation, it has become increasingly clear that the "public" is not a
monolithic entity. This should come as no surprise; we live in a
pluralistic society in which one person's gain is another's loss. It has
also become apparent that there are several models available for
structuring public participation into the regulatory decision making
process.
The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the different
"publics" that claim rights of participation in risk regulation and to
explore briefly the legitimacy of those claims. The paper will also
suggest several models for public participation in risk regulation and
examine the advantages and disadvantages of each. The paper accepts
the premise that public participation is necessary and desirable, but it
suggests that, in the more complicated world of the 1990's, serious
thought should be given to the appropriate role for different publics in
different regulatory proceedings.
II. Who is the "public"?
The early debates about public participation in the administrative
process focused on the threshold question whether any entity other than
3 See Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1987); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J. 729 (1979).
McGarity: Public Participation in Risk Regulation 107
the regulated industry and the agency (and in some contexts the union of
the regulated company) had "standing" to participate in the regulatory
process. The debate took place in relatively formal administrative
contexts, such as Atomic Energy Commission licensing proceedings
and Food and Drug Administration formal rule making hearings. Since
the proceedings closely resembled judicial proceedings, the agencies and
the commentators easily adopted the "standing" metaphor that had
already received considerable judicial gloss. In time, the more perceptive
observers pointed out that the judicial wisdom on "standing" before
courts was generally irrelevant to the question of who should participate
in administrative agency decision making, because the separation of
powers considerations that informed judicial analysis of the problem
were inapplicable to a purely administrative action.4 Nevertheless,
some of the policy considerations that motivate courts to deny standing
to parties that lack a sufficient interest in a judicial proceeding are
relevant to the question whether formal administrative hearings should
be open to everyone, and the agencies tended to focus on the "interest"
of the person seeking to participate. Paralleling a similar judicial debate,
and with some judicial prodding,5 the agencies finally came around to
the view that someone who purported to speak for the "public interest"
should have an opportunity to participate. This view had to overcome,
however, considerable resistance on the part of agencies and the
regulated interests, who often insisted that the agency itself was an
adequate guardian of the public interest.
Two things happened in the consumer/environmental decade to
4 See generally, Crampton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L. J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn,
Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L. J. 359 (1972).
5 See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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change permanently the debate over public participation in agency
decision making. First, the courts expanded rather dramatically the
range of interests that could seek judicial relief. Aesthetic and
environmental interests were welcome in court along with the economic
interests that had always dominated courtroom adjudication. Second, the
nature of the administrative decision making process changed
dramatically, as agencies (with both judicial prodding and congressional
insistence) began to make regulatory policy explicitly through rule
making and other less formal policy making tools. By the end of the
1970's it was clear that representatives of "public interest" groups could
present their views of the public interest in most regulatory forums that
addressed risk regulation. But with the corresponding proliferation of
"public interest" groups, it became increasingly less clear what the
"public interest" in a particular issue was and who appropriately spoke
for that interest. At the beginning of the 1990's, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that the public has a multiplicity of interests and
that no single group can claim lay exclusive claim to the role of
spokesperson.
A. Interested individuals
Perhaps the most universally accepted representative of the "public"
is an individual who is merely interested in the subject matter of the
administrative decision making process and desires to offer views or
proof relevant to that proceeding. Very few individuals have such an
interest in governmental decision making in the abstract to justify the
expenditure of time and money that often attends such participation, but
some individuals can be so acutely affected, either economically,
morally or aesthetically, by the predictable outcome of the process, that
they are willing to invest their own time or money in an effort to affect
the result.
Other individuals have a professional interest in the technical aspects
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of particular administrative proceedings and are willing to spend time
and/or resources participating in the administrative process to some
degree to share their perspectives with the agency. For example,
scientists conducting research in areas related to the issues raised in a
standard-setting proceeding might desire to participate as a professional
matter. At the very least, such professionals usually want the agency to
ask their advice about matters upon which they claim expertise. For the
most part, these participants do so out of a sense of obligation to share
their talents with society or perhaps out of a desire to have some
influence on momentous decisions.
B. Local Public Interest Groups
It is not at all unusual for a group of individuals who share a
common interest in the subject matter of an administrative proceeding to
form a loosely coordinated group solely for the purpose of affecting its
outcome. For example, a group of residents near a proposed hazardous
waste incinerator may have few interests in common but nevertheless
band together to urge the relevant agency to refuse the permit. When the
stimulus disappears, the group typically dissolves, although there are
numerous examples of such ad hoc groups achieving some degree of
permanence. The tendency of such groups is to focus very intensely
upon a particular decision or issue to the exclusion of similar decisions
in other contexts. National public interest groups find it notoriously
difficult to mobilize such grass roots organizations into an' effective
constituency, because they lack continuity and tend to splinter easily
once the focus is broadened. They are generally very effective for a brief
period of time, however, in raising the public consciousness about the
particular issues that are of concern to them. For decisions involving
risks and benefits that fall primarily upon local communities, such
groups can very persuasively claim a legitimacy that national public
interest groups often lack.
C. National Public Interest Groups
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National public interest groups are often created to deal with large
issues of nationwide importance or to address local issues that recur
throughout the country. Although "fly-by-night" national public interest
groups are not unheard of, the national groups tend to have a higher
degree of stability than local groups, and they generally have more
resources available to them, often coming from large national
foundations. Although national groups tend to focus on broad national
issues, they can on occasion participate vigorously in local decisions,
where they must occasionally rebut suggestions that they are outsiders
and troublemakers.
Not long after such national public interest groups as the Sierra
Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Environmental
Defense Fund began to participate actively in environmental decision
making at EPA, business-oriented public interest groups began
springing up to advocate less stringent regulation and to intervene on the
part of regulated industries. Although often accused of being mere
industry fronts, some of these groups no doubt genuinely desire to
advance an alternative definition of the "public interest" that views
unfettered free enterprise as a worthwhile social goal. These newer
groups have attempted to persuade regulatory decision makers that pro-
consumer and pro-environmental groups do not have an exclusive claim
to be representatives of the public interest, and they seem to take
particular pleasure in invoking health and environmental statutes to
impede governmental action aimed at protecting health and the
environment.6
D. Regulated Industry and Trade Associations
It perhaps goes without saying that the regulated industries
themselves and their representative trade associations desire to
participate in the administrative decision making process insofar as it
6 See, e.g., Castle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980).
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affects their economic interests. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure
Act and numerous agency procedural regulations were designed largely
with the prospect of participation by the regulatee in mind.
E. Affected Labor Groups
Labor unions often play an active role in administrative proceedings
that protect workers, even nonunionized workers. Thus, it is not
surprising that labor unions play a prominent role in decision making in
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. When OSHA
regulates toxic substances in the workplace, the labor unions and the
environmental groups often have common interests and present a united
front. On the other hand, when the issue is perceived to be jobs versus
wildlife or aesthetic values, labor unions often pragmatically side with
employers in resisting costly environmental restrictions that might cause
companies to close up shop.
F. Competitors
One seldom mentioned representative of the "public interest" is the
competitor of the regulated entity or industry. A paper manufacturing
plant that has expended millions of dollars installing new pollution
control technology has an obvious economic interest in ensuring that its
competitor is required to install the same technology. The railroad
industry, which must comply with numerous environmental controls,
does not want the government building dams that facilitate barge
traffic. 7 Thus, railroad companies are sometimes willing to participate
with environmental and farmer groups in administrative proceedings and
even assume a considerable share of the financial burden of public
participation in such proceedings.
I. Advantages and Disadvantages of
Public Participation in Risk Regulation
7 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calloway, 382 F. Supp.
610 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
I RISK -Issues inHealth & Safety 103 [Spring 1990]
Public participation in some form has become an accepted norm of
administrative decision making. It tends to bear out in practice the
aspiration that ours is a government by the people. No individual is so
insignificant that he or she cannot demand an opportunity to be heard
before the government acts to his or her detriment. Public participation
is an essential component of good government. Members of the public
can make relevant facts available to decision makers and allow them to
view issues from different perspectives. If the public officials are
attentive, better decisions should result. Public participation also has a
desirable tendency to open up governmental decision making to public
scrutiny. The public in general becomes better informed about how
decisions are made in the real world and about what factors actually
motivate bureaucratic policy makers. Finally, broad public participation
tends to produce a better record for judicial review. For all of these
reasons, public participation tends to legitimate administrative decision
making.
Public participation is not, however, an unalloyed good. Allowing
individuals and groups to challenge an agency's decision making forces
the agency to expend resources defending itself that might otherwise be
spent pursuing its statutory mission. Similarly, it requires regulatees in
the private sector to expend additional resources beyond those required
to deal with the agency itself. Public participation is time consuming.
For a harried bureaucrat or a company executive whose interest
payments mount while a permit application is pending, the time
consumed in public participation is perceived as delay. Indeed, potential
participants can use the threat of delay to extract substantive concessions
from the agency and regulators. Although it is unfair to characterize all
time consumed in public participation as "delay", 8 public participation
8 1 agree with Jacks that time consumed by public participation in
administrative decision making constitutes "delay" only if it performs no function or
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undeniably slows down the governmental wheels.
To the extent that effective public participation requires a two-way
exchange of information, it can be inconsistent with a regulatee's
legitimate interest in protecting valuable trade secrets and financial
information. This clash of interests becomes particularly acute in the
context of health and environmental regulation, where the identity of a
chemical and the content of any health and safety data concerning that
chemical are critical to effective participation by environmental groups,
but can also yield undeserved commercial advantages to competitors.
For example, the identity of the segment of DNA inserted into that of a
plant genetically engineered to secrete an insecticide is of obvious
interest to both competitors and to persons concerned with the
environmental effects of widespread use of the plant. This clash of
interests suggests that not all participants should be treated equally in all
aspects of regulatory decision making.
Fortunately, a sufficiently large variety of vehicles for channeling
public participation into the decision making process exists to facilitate a
fair and efficient balance of the advantages of participation against its
disadvantages. The remainder of this paper will examine several models
of public participation and suggest some factors that might guide a
policy maker's choice among them.
IV. Six Public Participation Models
As might be expected in a large and diverse federal system, public
participation in administrative decision making comes in many shapes
and sizes, ranging from a virtual delegation of decision making power to
specified members of the public to complete exclusion. While the
following discussion of six discrete models of public participation
should convey a sense of the wide variety of participation modes, it
is dysfunctional. Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom: Participation in AEC
Regulatory Proceedings, 5 Tex. L. REv. 466, 506-511 (1974).
I RISK -Issues in Health &.Safety 103 [Spring 1990]
nevertheless masks to some extent the rich diversity that exists in the
real world. Indeed, the models might more properly be viewed as
locations along a spectrum of possible variations. The purpose of the
effort is not to see how many discrete models can be identified; it is to
convey to policy makers a feel for the choices that exist and the
considerations that might inform those choices.
A. The Exclusionary Model
At one extreme on the spectrum of public participation paradigms is
the traditional exclusionary model. Under this model the regulated
industry and the agency fought out regulatory battles among themselves
in the context of a fairly formal regulatory process. If, as was often the
case, they made their peace on terms acceptable to both entities, the
matter was closed without further inquiry into whether the agreed-upon
solution was in the public interest. The assumption was that the agency
was the exclusive guardian of the public interest, and any self-
proclaimed representative of the public interest was an officious
intermeddler. The only members of the public who were invited to
participate in the process were the regulated industry and perhaps unions
and competitors, depending on the issues.9
The exclusionary model has been thoroughly rejected in nearly all
regulatory agencies. Still the model has appeal in some contexts. For
example, although agencies could not lawfully attempt to exclude
interested members of the public who would be adversely affected by
the outcomes of formal adjudicatory proceedings, they might
legitimately attempt to limit that participation to exclude irrelevant
evidence and arguments and to prevent duplicative cross-examination by
public interest intervenors. 10 Even in less formal contexts, agencies
might exclude especially confrontational forms of participation in the
9 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1969).
10 See Jacks, supra note 8, at 511-513.
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interest of decorum. For the most part, however, the exclusionary
model does not fit well into currently accepted norms of public
participation in informal decision making structures. There is very little
lost by allowing an interested (even an officious) person to write down
his views and insist that they be read by some responsible official.
Similarly, it is rarely burdensome for an agency to allow interested
individuals or representives of groups to testify briefly at informal "vent
your spleen" hearings. Since most health and environmental agencies
make important, binding decisions through informal rule making, this
suggests that the exclusionary model is by-and-large inappropriate for
risk-oriented decision making.
There is one small area, however, in which the exclusionary model
may have an appropriate role, even in informal administrative
proceedings. As previously mentioned, health and environmental
decision makers often need to examine and evaluate commercially
sensitive information. Members of the public desiring to participate in
the decision making process will understandably want to see the
information upon which the agency relies, and they usually consider this
an essential element of effective public participation. The problem arises
from the fact that competitors are also members of the public, who have
an appropriate role to play but no legitimate interest in using the
information to advance their own economic interests. Although
procedural tools, such as protective orders, are sometimes available in
more formal contexts, there is no easy way other than exclusion to
prevent the information from coming to the attention of a competitor
who might use it to the disadvantage of the regulatee. In this relatively
limited situation, the policy in favor of protecting the regulatee's
investment in producing the information argues in favor of invoking the
exclusionary model, for such competitors.
The question remains whether other members of the public who
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might either intentionally or inadvertently reveal commercially sensitive
information to competitors ought to be deprived of the information
thereby be effectively excluded from full participation in the decision
making process. This issue has plagued several health and safety
agencies, and it has never been resolved to the satisfaction of all
concerned. 11 Clearly, a solution must involve a balancing of the
regulatee's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of commercially
sensitive information against the interest of members of the public in
having access to the data that underlies agency decision making. 12
B. The Confrontational Model
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the confrontational model.
Although it too is one of the least desirable models, it also has ample
historical precedent. Indeed, the confrontational model often results
from an excessively stringent application of the exclusionary model.
When an individual or group feels that it is being excluded from the
decision making process or that its interests are not being adequately
considered by an agency, it can simply confront the agency at every
available opportunity with any available tools, including civil
disobedience. During the 1980's, the picket lines manned by outraged
neighbors of proposed hazardous waste dumps became familiar sights,
as did shouting matches at city council meetings during debates about
whether municipal solid waste incinerators should be constructed to
reduce demand on limited landfill capacities. More. serious
confrontations result from attempts by activists to disrupt private
11 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, codified at 7 U.S.C.§
136 et seq., for example, provides that health and safety data are not confidential
business information and are therefore disclosable. 7 U.S.C.§ 136h (d)(1) (1980).
Companies, however, may not use the information without providing compensation
to the producers of the data. 7 U.S. C. § 136a (c) (1 )(D) (ii) (1980).
12 See McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REv.
837 (1980).
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initiatives that might pose risks to health or the environment. It is not
unusual to hear of an individual chaining himself to a tree that is
scheduled for cutting or pouring glop from a company's outfall onto the
desk of its chief executive officer. 1 3 Recently, a group of
environmental activists in Austin "occupied" several small caves on
private property in protest against scheduled development of the
property that would pose a risk to several endangered insect species that
inhabited the caves. 14 On relatively rare occasions, the confrontations
can even become violent, as the confrontation between the
environmental organization Greenpeace and the French government over
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons near New Zealand a few years
ago, tragically demonstrated. 15
Although such confrontations are usually intended to be very public,
they are not designed to be participatory and they are definitely not
conducive to informed dialogue about risks and the measures that can he
taken to reduce risks. Occasionally a decision maker will be persuaded
to agree to talk with the activists in order to induce them to cease their
disruptive activities, but rarely will they be asked to participate in the
actual decision making process; nor would they necessarily be willing to
participate, even if asked.
The confrontational model reflects a high degree of distrust among
the activists in the process itself. Because they strongly perceive the
process to be failing, the activists seek a wider audience. The model
requires a high degree of commitment to the issues at stake, because
individuals often participate only at considerable risk to their own
economic and even physical well-being. Generally, only highly
13 See, e.g., 8 From Greenpeace Held for Plugging Waste Line, New York
Times, April 23, 1985, at A15, col. 1.
14 See Environmentalists Vow to Continue Occupation of Caves, Austin
American-Statesman, Sept. 1, 1988, at B22, col. 5.
15 1 Killed as 2 Blasts Sink Greenpeace Protest Ship, Los Angeles Times, July
11, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
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emotional issues or matters of high principle are likely to inspire
sufficient devotion to justify such risks. Regulatory decisions that affect
purely economic interests do not often invoke the confrontational model.
The confrontational model does appear to be effective in addressing
matters of intense local interest. Even though a regulatory body is
putatively obliged to render a decision based upon identified statutory or
regulatory criteria, all agencies are politically responsible and therefore
abhor confrontation. Confrontation can be very effective in persuading
agencies to reconsider decisions previously made. When the activists
attract the sympathy of a large number of otherwise inactive members of
the public (as, for example, in mounting resistance to a hazardous waste
dump), they are often highly successful in achieving their desired
results, though not always (or even usually) through the existing
decision making structures.
The model is not invoked frequently by national "public interest"
groups to address broad issues of national importance. Perhaps the
threat of arrest and prosecution is too large for national public interest
group leaders, or it may be that confrontation is an ineffective tool for an
entity that plans to keep its concerns on the public agenda for the long
haul and therefore must be able to deal on a civil, if arms length, basis
with regulatory decision makers and representatives of regulated
entities. The relatively recent advent of the environmental group Earth
First!, which advocates confrontational tactics and whose newsletter
contains a suggestion box entitled, "Ecotage", and the successful
confrontational style of the Green Party in Europe, may signal a change
in this perception. At present, however, the confrontational model is
largely restricted to local activities, and they are usually employed by
individuals or local ad hoe groups.
C. The Adversarial Model
Under the adversarial model, all interested persons have a right to
McGarity: Public Participation in Risk Regulation 119
participate in the decision making process by submitting facts, evidence,
views and arguments. Each of the parties may make its own arguments
and attempt to rebut the arguments of other participants. The agency
assumes the position of neutral decision maker, dispassionately
weighing the arguments of both sides of the relevant issues in
accordance with objective criteria. Because courtroom adjudication is the
origin of the adversarial model, it is usually invoked in the context of
formal agency adjudication, which draws heavily upon the courtroom
analogy. Parties are usually represented by counsel, and they have a
right to submit direct testimony, usually through experts. Though cross-
examination is not absolutely required, it is often allowed. A transcript
of the agency hearing is usually prepared. Since the agency relies
heavily on the parties for the information and analysis upon which it
bases its decisions, the adversarial model is often used in the context of
licensing products and technologies, such as pesticides and nuclear
power plants where the applicant is required to submit information in
accordance with predetermined data requirements. The model demands
that the decision maker explain his or her decision to the winners and the
losers, often according to a precise formula, requiring, e.g., "findings
of fact" and "conclusions of law". This element enhances the legitimacy
of the process and helps to ensure that the decision was in fact based on
the neutral application of particular criteria to particular facts or
circumstances.
The adversarial model presents a forum for structured debate among
designated representatives of relevant interest groups. In regulatory
proceedings involving risk management, scientific expertise has a role to
play and scientists with different views may normally present their own
views and criticize the views of others through the presentation of expert
testimony. Yet there is no attempt to achieve a scientific consensus on
important scientific or technical issues. Indeed, the process is usually
I RISK -Issues inHealth & Safety 103 [Spring 1990]
dominated by lawyers, who are familiar with such structured decision
making tools. Although the outcome of proceeding under the adversarial
model can be a "settlement", which represents an agreed-upon
compromise, the model presumes that there will be winners and losers.
The adversarial model traditionally dominated administrative
decision making at the federal level, prior to the advent of the "rule
making revolution" of the 1970's. Although anyone who is sufficiently
aggrieved may participate in agency decision making under the model,
the primary players tend to be the agency staff, the regulated industry
and one or more national public interest groups or unions. The expense
of formal participation, which as a practical matter usually requires a
lawyer, usually dissuades persons without a strong interest in the
outcome from participating. Sometimes financial limitations prevent
individuals or groups with strong interests but few resources from
participating. The expectation among all parties is that the agency's
determination will be appealed to a court for a structured review by non-
scientists in an adversarial context.
The adversarial model fosters a "we" versus "they" attitude among
the participants that impedes compromise and facilitates feelings of
disgruntlement. Rarely is everyone satisfied by the outcome, and there
can even be a good deal of dissatisfaction on all sides about relatively
trivial procedural rulings during the proceedings. Although the agency
can attempt to cast its decision in scientific or technical terms, the
sophisticated players at the national level know that policy
considerations usually predominate, and they try their best to hold the
decision maker accountable in both the reviewing courts and the courts
of public opinion. At the same time, the adversarial model can broaden
the range of fact and extend the policy options available to the decision
maker. It also ensures that all affected interests have a relatively
complete opportunity to convey facts and express views.
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D. The Due Consideration Model
A close cousin of the adversarial model is the "due consideration"
model, under which all interested parties are welcome to submit views
and the agency is obliged to give "due consideration" to all relevant facts
and arguments. As the model has evolved through the last two to three
decades an additional requirement that the agency explain why it chose
the option that it adopted has become an essential element of the model.
The model obviously describes informal rule making under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 16 Since a very large part of decision
making involving risk management at the federal level is done in the
context of informal rule making, the due consideration model is very
relevant to risk management.
The due consideration model resembles the adversarial model in that
it allows every interest to make its case for why it is right and the other
parties are wrong. It also presumes a neutral decision maker who is
swayed only by facts and analyses. Since it makes no attempt to bring
the affected interests together to achieve an amicable resolution of the
issue, it yields winners and losers.
The model differs from the adversarial model, however, in several
subtle ways. First, the agency usually takes a position in advance of the
public hearing and invites public comment on the agency's position as
well as on the issues generally. Second, the parties therefore do not
define the relevant issues to quite the same extent that they do in the
adversarial model. Third, the model generally does not adopt all of the
procedural protections of the adversarial model, and it is therefore
correspondingly less burdensome for the agency. Fourth, the agency
relies more on its own sources of information and analysis than under
the adversarial model, in which the parties are expected to be the
16 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977).
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primary sources of information. Finally, the agency is only required to
give due consideration to all of the facts and analysis submitted by
outsiders and explain its chosen course of action.
The due consideration model is not nearly as procedurally
ponderous as the adversarial model, but it lacks the adversarial model's
ability to cut through to the nub of arguments having surface plausibility
but little factual support. The due consideration model is better adapted
to issues that are policy dominated and for which factual accuracy is not
essential. From the standpoint of the participants, the due consideration
model is not as satisfying as the adversarial model or the mediation
model to be discussed next. The participants are less directly involved in
the actual decision making process: Suspicions are easily raised that the
agency is not really giving due consideration to other points of view,
especially when it adopts the option that it initially proposed.
E. The Mediation Model
Under the mediation model, representatives of groups with an
interest in a regulatory decision meet together, often with the aid of a
"mediator" or "facilitator", to present facts and arguments to one another
and to try to reach an agreement on the ultimate result. The regulatory
agency, which may either participate actively in the discussions or play
the mediating role, then attempts to implement the agreed upon solution.
Public participation may be invited at this step, but it is largely pro
forma. At the federal level the mediation model has been pursued
actively through the concept of "regulatory negotiation". 17 Negotiated
17 See generally, Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71
GEa. L. J. 1 (1982); Perritt, Analysis of Few Negotiated Rulemaking Efforts,
reprinted in 1985 Reports and Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of
the United States 637. The Administrative Conference of the United States has
endorsed one subspecies of regulatory negotiation (viz. "negotiated rulemaking").
The Conference noted that:
[p]articipants in rulemaking rarely meet as a group with each other and
with the agency to communicate their respective views so that each can
react directly to the concerns and positions of the others in an effort to
resolve conflicts." The Conference concluded that "if the parties in
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rule making involves broad discussions among all interested parties with
the goal of arriving at a consensus on a proposed rule.18 The agency
must appoint an official to convene and organize the negotiations, and it
can also appoint a mediator to facilitate agreements. 19 Ground rules for
the negotiations are established by the participants at the outset. The
negotiators then meet until they have reached agreement, until they have
agreed that they will not reach agreement, or until a previously imposed
deadline. Depending on how intensely the negotiators go about their
work, the entire process can consume from six months to a year.2 0 The
Conference then recommended procedures to facilitate regulatory
negotiation.2 1
The Conference's early optimistic assessment of negotiated rule
making as a vehicle for facilitating dispute resolution in a highly
participatory context presumed that most interest groups genuinely
accepted the legitimacy of risk regulation by federal agencies and were
willing to work within the current statutory and administrative
framework. With some exceptions, these assumptions no doubt hold for
major companies, trade associations, universities, and national public
interest were to work together to negotiate the pros of a proposed rule,
they might be able to identify the major issues, judge their importance
to the respective parties, identify the information and data necessary to
resolve the issues, and develop a rule that is acceptable to the respective
winners, all within the contours of the substantive statutes.
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1990).
18 Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 85-5,
Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1985 ACUS 23-27 (hereinafter
1985 ACUS Recommendation); Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation No. 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 47
Fed. Reg. 30708 (1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. §305.82-4 (1990)).
19 1985 ACUS Recommendation, supra, at 26; see generally, Harter supra
note 17, at 67-82.
20 Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 82-4,
Procedures for Negotiated Rulemaking, supra note 18.
21 Id.
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interest groups. When the negotiations are successful, the agency
should be able to promulgate the proposed rule with substantial cost and
time savings. Other advantages include the avoidance of litigation, the
possibility of more accurately identifying the real concerns of the parties
(because they do not engage in the posturing that occurs in litigation),
the opportunity to identify the intensity of the parties' concerns over
various issues, and the legitimacy the promulgated rule will enjoy
because it was a joint product of the agency and the parties.22
Some argue, however, that even at the national level, the mediation
model is not likely to be very effective. For example, some argue that
there is too much distrust between management and labor for this idea to
function effectively in OSHA. Others point out that negotiated rule
making will not be successful unless the parties believe that, if they do
not negotiate an agreement, a decision will occur anyway. Most would
agree with Harter that the mediation model has the greatest probability of
success when:2 3
(1) each party has power to influence the outcome of a
pending decision; (2) the number of parties is small enough
that negotiations can effectively take place; (3) issues are
sufficiently "mature" that the parties are ready to decide
them; (4) there is sufficient pressure to resolve the matter
because otherwise the agency will do so; (5) the parties have
something to gain from the negotiations; (6) there are not
fundamental value conflicts between the parties which
prevent the negotiation over the outcome; (7) there are a
sufficient number of contested issues that trade-offs are
possible between the parties; (8) the resolution of the dispute
depends on policy decisions for which there are no objective
solutions; and (9) the framework of the negotiations include
an effective method to implement decisions reached during
them.
For the sometimes more confrontational disputes that occur at the
22 See Harter, supra note 17, at 28-31.
23 See Harter, supra note 17, at 42-52.
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local level, the mediation model may be more difficult to implement,
because passions tend to run higher and because many groups lack
long-term goals. The process has been codified in the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) and even further defined under the Texas
Administrative Code. Any applicant for a solid waste disposal permit is
encouraged to enter into an agreement with, and identify the concerns
of, the local residents.24 A local review committee is formed to interact
with the applicant and to express the concerns of the community. It will
then attempt to resolve both technical and nontechnical points of
contention.
During their 90 day tenure, the committee meets with two of the
developer's representatives. 25 The applicant has representatives at the
committee meetings. He has a duty to assign a person with a position of
authority.2 6 At all meetings, the applicant will provide for a technical
advisor and a second representative, who is not to be an attorney.27 At
the end of 90 days, the local review committee prepares a report
pinpointing both the resolved and unresolved issues. The report is then
submitted with the permit application to the relevant state agency.2 8
The committee's report must identify the issues that were resolved and
those that were left unanswered. Essentially, it is a fact-finding report
that may prove useful to both the community and the agency that
considers the technical merit of the application.2 9 Nevertheless, the
24 25 Tex. ADMIN. CODE 325.64 (a) (1986); Tex. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.063 (a) (Vernon 1990).
25 Keystone Workshop, THE KEYSTONE SITING PROCESS HANDBOOK, 7 (1984)
(available from Tex. Dept. of Water Resources and Tex. Dept. of Health) [hereinafter
KEYSTONE HANDBOOK].
26 IdL
27 KEYSroNE HINDBOOK, supra note 25, at 9.
28 25 Tex. ADMiN. CODE 325.64 (b) (1986); Tex. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.063 (j) (Vernon 1990).
29 KEYSmONE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 3. Bowman, The Keystone Process:
An Evaluation of its Test Cases 11 (1988) (available from author).
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Keystone Center has proposed, and the SNR of Texas has adopted, a
mediation process for channeling local disputes over siting hazardous
waste disposal facilities that has been enacted into law in Texas. The
Keystone process is a method by which a developer who wishes to
construct a solid waste facility may undergo negotiations with
representatives of the local community in an attempt to mitigate public
opposition.30 A "site-specific" team is appointed t6 review and perhaps
modify the developer's proposal but it has no authority to submit a
recommendation. 3 1 Rather, the team is "to assist both permit applicants
and the public in identifying items of mutual concern in the siting of
environmentally sound hazardous waste facilities". 32
At the core of the Keystone process is the idea of facilitating
dialogue between the applicant and the public. 33 The ultimate goal of
the committee is to prepare a report detailing citizen concerns and the
manner in which the applicant will deal with them.34 By working with
30 The process was developed in response to public opposition to the attempts of
the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority (GCA) to site a high-technology hazardous
waste facility in southeast Harris County. As a result of the turmoil, the GCA gave
grants to the Keystone Center, a nonprofit organization that addresses environmental
and public policy issues, to sponsor two workshops that would focus on the siting of
hazardous waste facilities. Thirty-five participants, mostly Texans, who represented
the state and local governments, industry, environmental organizations, public
interest groups, law and engineering, attended the workshops. The Keystone approach
to siting these waste facilities was developed and a report setting forth the procedure
was produced. (Siting Waste Management Facilities in the Galveston Bay Area: A
New Approach, Report of the Keystone Workshops on Siting Nonradioactive
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, Held 17-20 August 1982 at Keystone,
Colorado, and 21-23 October 1982 at West Columbia, Texas). Additionally, the
group wrote THE KEYSTONE HANDBOOK, supra note 25.
31 The committee's purpose is to "compliment the present permitting process,
not to delay it or substitute for it." For example, the committee has no power to
recommend alternative sites. Bowman, supra note 29.
32 KEYSToNE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 1.
33 KEYStoNE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 4.
34 T,4
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the public early in the process, the group can work to reduce the
potential for misinformation about local projects for which risk
perceptions are very high.35
The Keystone process has been tested on at least two occasions. In
1985, the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority (GCA) proposed to
construct an incinerator at its existing landfill and waste water treatment
plant in Texas City. The committee in Texas City acted fairly well as a
conduit between the community and the developer. Of twenty-four
issues raised, the applicant satisfactorily responded to seventeen, and
seven were left as "unresolved". The appropriateness of the selected
site, however, was not an item that the the committee addressed.36
According to one participant, the process was successful in three
regards. First, more than one-half of the issues were resolved by the
process.37 Second, there was a change of attitude of the participants: A
survey revealed that the members of the committee had a greater trust in
the applicant after the process. There was also a shift in the attitudes
regarding the facility in that concern about transportation decreased with
a corresponding increase in concern over foreign waste. Third, the
participants indicated that they were very pleased with the process. 38
The project, however, failed in its ultimate objective of eliminating
the need for lengthy hearings. A long public hearing on the facility is
inevitable.
The second project on which the Keystone process was used in
Texas concerned a secret request from an industry wanting to construct
a hazardous waste management facility in East Texas. The developer
contracted directly with the Keystone Center to facilitate public
participation and to provide necessary clerical help.3 9 Under the
35 Id.
36 Bowman, supra note 29, at 8.
37 Bowman, supra note 29, at 10-11.
38 Bowman, supra note 29, at 11.
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contract, the members appointed were to be trained by the Center.
Unfortunately, city officials knew nothing about the project until its
existence was leaked to a local newspaper, nor did they know any of the
Texstar executives or the Keystone Group members. Not surprisingly,
this colored local attitudes toward the process. Although some of these
feelings were resolved, the committee eventually disbanded when
Texstar refused to give them exclusive control over the selection of a
facilitator 40
At the national level, the mediation model attempts to facilitate
compromises among well-informed representatives of contending
groups. The model facilitates the flow of information, but its primary
purpose is not scientific dialogue. The model recognizes that few of the
important issues will be resolved by technical expertise and that most
require political compromise. At the local level, the mediation model
must educate as well as facilitate agreements of a political nature. One of
the primary goals of the Keystone process, for example, is to educate
worried local activists about the hazards of solid waste disposal
facilities. The Texstar experience indicates, however, that building trust
is an especially important function of the mediation model at the local
level. People will refuse to be "educated" by what they regard to be a
biased source.
F. The Advisory Committee Model
The advisory committee model closely resembles the mediation
model, except that it relies heavily on scientific and technological
expertise. Under that model, the decision maker appoints a committee of
disinterested experts to advise the agency on technical issues. The
experts deliberate in accordance with scientific norms, analyze the
scientific reports, debate about the proper interpretations and inferences
39 Bowman, supra note 29, at 6.
40 Bowman, supra note 29, at 7.
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to give to and draw from the scientific data, and ultimately advise the
decision maker on how he should resolve the issues. While there may
still be a public proceeding using either the adversarial or due
consideration models, the advice of the experts weighs very heavily in
the agency's ultimate decision.
Since technical considerations are often close to the heart of risk
management, this model is attractive to decision makers who are not
scientifically trained. Even though many science policy disputes that
arise in connection with risk assessment and risk management are policy
dominated, the advisory committee model can be attractive to policy
makers who do not want to "take the heat" for resolving policy
questions. If the issues can be made to appear to be technical in nature
and if a group of disinterested and highly qualified experts expresses a
view on the issue after due deliberation, then the decision maker can
avoid the accountability that goes along with tough decision making.
The decision maker, to some degree, loses control over the outcome of
the decision making process, but even that disadvantage can be reduced
by choosing experts for the advisory committee whose views on the
technical issues will yield results that are in accordance with the decision
maker's policy preferences.
On the public participation spectrum, the advisory committee model
is located close to the exclusionary model. Only credentialed experts are
invited to participate on the advisory committees, and the experts are not
necessarily chosen to reflect different scientific perspectives. In some
manifestations, the advisory committee model incorporates some
participatory elements. For example, the Federal Advisory Committee
Act requires that federal advisory committees be "balanced", but that has
not been read to imply that such committees be chosen from expert
representatives of particular interest groups. The Occupational Safety
and Health Act requires that advisory committees on individual standard
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setting initiatives be composed of at least one designee of the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, at least one representative of state health
and safety agencies, and an equal number of representatives from labor
and management.4 1 Although the OSHA advisory committee structure
is more participatory than the others, the agency has used it only rarely,
in part because advisory committees so composed could rarely reach
consensus. One observer reported that advisory committee meetings
"did little more than provide a forum for the contending parties - labor
and employers - to argue with each other."42 Thus while the OSHA
model provided effective public participation, it did not comport with the
image of an advisory committee as a body of experts dispensing
unbiased advice.
V. Conclusion
Administrative policy makers have a wide variety of models from
which to choose in selecting a decision making vehicle that addresses
the complex scientific and technical issues and emotionally charged
policy questions that arise in risk assessment and risk management.
Which model the policy maker chooses should, to some degree, reflect
the extent to which the agency desires public input into the decision
making process and the extent to which countervailing policies preclude
public participation..
41 29 U.S.C. § 656(b) (1985).
42 T. GREENWOOD,KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOvERNMENT REGULATION
125 (1984).
